Abstract. We consider a framework for solving optimal liquidation problems in limit order books.
Introduction
Liquidation of large securities positions has emerged as an important problem in financial mathematics, linking together models of market microstructure and control theory. In this paper we consider an investor who liquidates a position through limit orders placed in a limit order book (LOB). The investor does so by choosing the price of the limit order; the higher the price of the limit order, the smaller the probability that it would be filled. The objective of the investor is to come up with an optimal limit order strategy that maximizes her expected revenue by date T .
Our model for the above problem is based on a point-process view of limit order books which treats liquidation as a sequence of discrete events, i.e. order matches. More precisely, we assume that the investor effectively controls the frequency of her trades by choosing the spread s above the current bid price P t . The trade intensity is controlled as Λ(s) and when a trade occurs, the investor generates a liquidation profit of s. Similar setups have been proposed in [5] , [16, 15] and rely essentially on a queueing system representation of LOB's.
A crucial modeling difference is whether execution takes place through market or limit orders. If investor trades via market orders, she necessarily encounters price impact through "eating away" a portion of the LOB. The precise price impact depends on the shape of the LOB, as well as its resilience. Conversely, there is no transactions or fill risk as market orders execute instantaneously.
This point of view is taken in e.g., [24, 1, 2] . On the other hand, if the investor trades through limit orders, liquidation depends on being "lifted" by a sufficiently large market order, leading to substantial fill risk that again depends on the shape and depth of the LOB. The fill risk is related to the concept of virtual price impact [28] and is the focus of our model here. Related approaches to trading via limit orders can be found in [5, 14, 20, 21] . Also, in our previous work [12] we considered the same LOB as here but with an uncontrolled trade intensity and temporary price impact from order size.
Ideally, a fully specified model will reconcile the two approaches above, as well as consider the underlying risk preferences of the investor. This is especially important for dealing with simultaneous trading on multiple exchanges, see the very recent preprints [23, 22] , as well as Section 5.5 below. A full treatment of this problem will be the subject of a separate paper.
Our starting point is a discrete-state problem for an investor holding n shares of an illiquid asset, n ∈ N. Since practically speaking n is often large (on the order of hundreds of thousands), we also investigate the fluid limit of our setup. On a technical level, the fluid limit provides asymptotic results for the discrete-state problem (see Remark 3.3) , which is the main focus of our paper.
On a formal level, our control problem is equivalent to a controlled death process and is closely related to fluid approximations of some queueing problems. We refer to [8, 9, 10, 18, 25, 26] and references therein for the most relevant strand of this rich literature. In contrast with the previous literature, which uses probabilistic arguments, we utilize viscosity techniques to show convergence (both of the value functions and the corresponding optimal controls) from the discrete-to the continuous-state problems.
An investor holds n shares of an asset. Let (P t ) t≥0 be the bid price process for the underlying asset. Let r ≥ 0 be the risk-free rate. We assume that e −rt P t is a martingale with respect to the optimization measure P on a filtered probability space (Ω, F, (G t )). This assumption is consistent with standard market microstructure models, see e.g. [2] . Let Λ t be the (controlled) intensity of order fill, and let s t ≥ 0 be the spread between the bid price and the limit order of the investor.
Denote by N t the G-adapted counting process of order fills and τ k the corresponding arrival times,
Then N t − t 0 Λ s ds is a martingale and expected revenue is
We assume that the investor has a deadline date T ≤ +∞ by which all trades must be completed.
Remaining shares are liquidated at zero profit at T .
To introduce the liquidation control, we assume that Λ t = Λ(s t ), so that the intensity of order fills is a function of the offered spread above the bid price. Moreover, we assume that the bid price P is unaffected by the limit orders created via (s t ). Since e −rt P t is a martingale, the first term in
e −rτ i P τ i ] = nP 0 and we may ignore P in the subsequent analysis.
We define
is the time of liquidation. Here, X t := X 0 − N t , with X 0 = n, is a "death" (or inventory) process with intensity Λ(s t ). Note that T in (1.2) represents time-to-maturity and S T is the collection of F-adapted controls, s t ≥ 0 with F t := σ(N s : s ≤ t). The boundary conditions on V are V (n, 0) = 0 ∀n (terminal condition in time) and V (0, T ) = 0 ∀ T (exhaustion). Remark 1.1. Our model is related to the limit order book setup of [5] , which assumes that limit orders are "lifted" through sufficiently large market buy orders. Namely, a market buy order of size q, hits all limit sell orders that are within I(q) of the best bid. Assuming that buy market orders arrive in the form of a Poisson random measure on R + × R + with arrival intensityλdt and volume (mark) distribution f (dq), q ≥ 0, a sell limit order at a given spread u is lifted with probability P(I(q) > u). By the thinning lemma on Poisson processes, such matching buy orders form a Poisson process with intensityλ ∞ I −1 (u) f (dq). Empirical studies suggest a power-law depth function f (dq) ∝ q −1−a dq [5] and therefore if Λ(0) < ∞, we can view our model within the [5] framework, Λ(s) ∝ [I −1 (s)] −a , with I −1 the virtual price impact function [28] .
As in [11] , the above control problem can be transformed into a discrete-time Markov decision problem and the classical results from [13, Ch. 8] can be used to prove a dynamic programming principle. Using the latter result one can show that the value function is a viscosity solution of
with boundary conditions V (0, T ) = V (n, 0) = 0 and V T denoting partial derivative with respect to time-to-expiration. Standard results also imply that an optimal control can be taken of Markov feedback type, s * t = s(X * t , T − t). However, in most of the examples below we will obtain explicit solutions to this dynamic programming equation. Then a verification lemma can be used to justify that the solution of (1.4) is indeed the value function.
The optimization problem described in (1.2) is simplified but highly tractable. In most of the examples below, we are able to obtain closed-form solutions which provide direct insight into the relationship between the LOB model and its depth function and the investor's liquidation strategy.
In Section 2 we give an explicit solution for (1.2) in the case of a power-law intensity control Λ(s).
Section 3 then studies convergence of the discrete problem (1.4) to its continuous-state fluid limit.
Our key Theorem 3.1, complemented by Proposition 3.2 and Corollary 3.3, gives a full account of this convergence using techniques from viscosity solutions of nonlinear partial differential equations.
In Section 4 we return to (1.2) for the case where Λ(s) is of exponential shape; we are again able to provide several closed-form solutions. Finally, Section 5 considers several extensions and numerical illustrations of (1.2), including generic Λ(s), which shed additional light on the problem structure.
Power-Law Limit Order Books
In this section we assume that incoming buy orders have a power-law distribution for the spread, Λ(s) = λ s α for some α > 1. It can be observed from the computations below that if α ≤ 1, then no optimal control exists. Similar assumption was made (and justified empirically) by [5] who write that in realistic markets α ∈ [1.5, 3]. 
with c n satisfying the recursion
where
Remark 2.1. Note that V is "concave" in n in the sense that
i.e., its linear interpolation in n is concave in the usual sense. This follows immediately from (2.2)
where the inequality follows from the fact that c n (or V (n, T )) is increasing in n. The latter follows directly from (1.2).
Also observe from (2.1) and (2.2) that
which implies that n → s * (n, T ) is a decreasing function, because n → V (n, T ) is "concave". One can also think of s * as the derivative of the linear interpolation of V in n.
Proof. With the power law assumption (1.4) reduces to
and therefore the candidate optimal policy is t → s * (X t , T − t) in which s * (n, T ) = α α−1 (V (n, T ) − V (n − 1, T )). To begin solving this equation, we start with n = 1. Since V (0, T ) = 0 for all T , we
This is a separable ordinary differential equation (ODE) which simplifies to
Using the boundary condition V (1, 0) = 0 we integrate to obtain
Considering the equation for general n > 1 we therefore make the ansatz V (n, T ) = c n (1−e −rαT ) 1/α and plugging into (2.4) the relation (2.2) follows.
Remark 2.2. If no discounting is present r = 0, one can verify that the solution of (1.4) is V (n, T ) = d n T 1/α , where the sequence (d n ) satisfies the recursion
This result can also be obtained by taking the limit r → 0 in (2.1), (2.2).
Fixing X 0 = n, the inter-trade intervals σ i := τ i − τ i−1 , i ≤ n have survival functions given by
Noting that Λ(s * (n, T )) = C(n)
1−e −rαT for some constant C(n), it follows that ε 0 Λ(s * (n, T )) dT = +∞ for all n and ε and therefore P(σ i ≤ T −τ i−1 ) = 1 for all i ≤ n. We conclude that even though there is no direct penalty if some orders remain at T , with probability one, the full inventory is liquidated by T , X * T = 0 P-a.s. In particular, the problem with a hard liquidation constraint V (x, 0) = −M 1 {x≥0} for any liquidation penalty M ≥ 0 will have the same solution as in Proposition 2.1.
2.1. Infinite Horizon. As the execution horizon T grows, the investor faces a weaker liquidation constraint. Nevertheless, she still prefers to sell earlier than later due to the discount parameter r that incentivizes faster liquidation. For the limit T → ∞ we obtain an infinite-horizon model whereby strategies are time-homogenous.
Taking T → ∞ in (2.1) we find that V (n) = c n and s * (n) = λ 1/(α−1) (αrc n ) 1/(1−α) . To understand how quickly execution takes place let us introduce expected time to liquidate S(n) which is defined to be S(n) := E[τ (X * )|X * liquidation occurs at rate Λ(s * (n)), so that the interval until the next trade has an Exponential distribution with mean 1/Λ(s * (n)). It follows that
Continuous selling limit
To better understand the results of Proposition 2.1 we consider a limiting continuous model.
Let us denote the number of shares initially held by x.
We first introduce a sequence of discrete control problems that converge to the continuous selling limit. For 0 < ∆ ≤ 1, consider the problem where shares are sold at ∆ increments and the intensity of order fills is Λ ∆ (s) := Λ(s)/∆. We will denote by X ∆ the "death" process with this intensity and decrements of size ∆. Then the resulting value function
in viscosity sense.
Let us consider the first order partial differential equation (PDE)
which can be written as
with boundary conditions v(x, 0) = v(0, T ) = 0. The solution of (3.3) has the following deterministic control representation
where dX
In fact, the solution of (3.3) is explicitly given by
We denote the optimizer in (3.3) by s (0) (x, T ), which is explicitly given by
Remark 3.1. Plugging the optimizer back into the dynamics for X (0),x we obtain that
1 − e −rα(T −t) dt, which can be explicitly solved as
Let x ∈ R + be fixed and let us consider all the collections {0, ∆, 2∆, · · · } of grids that contain x as an element. In the next result, will show that as ∆ → 0 then V ∆ (x) → v(x). In fact, the next result shows that this convergence is uniform on compacts.
Proof. Let us consider the regularized stochastic control problem
Using a representation similar to the one in (3.1) and using the lower bound on the controls s ∈ S k T , it can be seen that
We will follow the arguments of [7] in the proof of their Theorem 2.1 (also see Theorem 4.1 on page 334 of [19] ) to show that V ∆,k converges uniformly on compacts to the unique viscosity solution of
Letv k and v k be defined by:
By definition we have that v k ≤ v k ≤v k and that v k is lower semi-continuous, andv k is upper semi-continuous; see e.g. Proposition 5.2.1 of [6] . We will show thatv k is a subsolution and that v k is a supersolution of (3.9). It follows from Theorem 5.4.20 in [6] that a comparison result holds for this PDE (the compactness of the control space is required in order to apply this result). This comparison theorem would then imply thatv k ≤ v k . As a result, v k =v k = v k is the unique continuous viscosity solution of (3.9) . This fact together with the way the functionsv k and v k are defined also imply the local uniform convergence of V ∆,k to v k . (For a similar argument see page 35 of [17] .)
We now prove thatv k is a viscosity subsolution of (3.9); the fact that v k is a viscosity supersolution follows similarly. Let (x 0 , T 0 ) be a local maximum ofv k − φ for some test function φ ∈ C 1,1 . Without loss of generality, we will assume that (x 0 , T 0 ) is a strict local maximum and thatv k (x 0 , T 0 ) = φ(x 0 , T 0 ), and φ ≥ 2 λ r k α−1 outside the ball B(x 0 , T 0 ; r), where r > 0 is chosen so that (x 0 , T 0 ) is the maximum ofv k − φ on B(x 0 , T 0 ; r). Thanks to the choice of the test function outside this ball, (x 0 , T 0 ) is in fact a global maximum of the functionv k − φ and it is attained on B(x 0 , T 0 ; r). (This is where the uniform boundedness assumption in (3.8) is used.)
Let (x ∆ , T ∆ ) ∈ {0, ∆, · · · } × R + be a point at which V ∆,k − φ attains its (global) maximum. It follows from the definition ofv k and the fact that (x 0 , T 0 ) is a strict global maximum ofv k − φ that there exists a sequence ∆ n → 0 such that (x ∆n , T ∆n ) → (x 0 , T 0 ), V ∆n,k − φ attains its global maximum at that point and V ∆n,k (x ∆n , T ∆n ) →v k (x 0 , T 0 ). From the global maximality
Moreover, it can be argued as in [11] using the discrete dynamic programming principle (see [13] )
in the viscosity sense. Then
Taking the limit as ∆ n → 0 we obtain from this equation that
which proves the subsolution property ofv k . Here, we exchange the limit in ∆ n and the supremum with respect to s using Proposition 7.32 in [13] which we can apply thanks to the compactness of the control space.
It follows again from Theorem 5.4.20 in [6] that the unique solution of (3.9) is given by
We will show that v k converges pointwise to v:
where the inequality follows from the lower semi-continuity of the map X → τ (X); see Lemma 5 in [18] . On the other hand, since v is a supersolution of (3.9), the comparison result Theorem 5. 4.20 in [6] implies that v k ≤ v for each k, and as a result
Combining the last two inequalities, we obtain the pointwise convergence of v k to v. Pointwise convergence, on the other hand, implies uniform convergence on compacts due to Dini's theorem, since we already know that v is a continuous function of its arguments, and that v k is an increasing sequence of functions. The latter fact follows from the fact that v k+1 is a supersolution of the PDE v k satisfies.
Remark 3.2. Results somewhat similar to Theorem 3.1 appeared in [8, 9, 10, 18, 25, 26] which are on the optimal control of queueing networks. (Among these papers only [18] considered optimal time-to-empty queueing control problems.) To prove Theorem 3.1 we used a completely different approach than the above literature, which had relied on probabilistic arguments. Our approach relies in contrast on the analytical approximation ideas of [7] . We see the prelimit control problem as the discretization (only in the space variable but not in the time variable) of the "fluid limit"
first order non-linear PDE (3.3) and rely on convergence of the approximation schemes to the viscosity solutions of such non-linear PDEs. This approach could be fruitful in general in proving "fluid limit" results associated to controlled queueing networks.
The following is a strengthening of Theorem 3.1 which is an interesting result in its own right.
Proof. We show that for any ∆ > 0, V 2∆ ≤ V ∆ . Due to the factoring of T and x in Proposition 2.1, it suffices to establish this result on the infinite horizon where strategies are constant between trading times.
Fix ε > 0 and let s 2∆ be an ε-optimal strategy for V 2∆ . This policy is defined over x ∈ {0, 2∆, 4∆, · · · }. We will recursively construct a policy s ∆ over the domain x ∈ {0, ∆, 2∆, · · · } that outperforms s 2∆ . The dynamic programming principle implies that
Similarly, given the liquidation strategy s ∆ and corresponding trading timesτ i , the resulting expected profits denoted asṼ ∆ (x), x ∈ {0, ∆, 2∆, · · · } satisfy for y = 2n∆,
Given s 2n ≡ s 2∆ (2n∆) we prove below that there exists u ∈ R + , such that 2Λ(u)+r := z < 1. Solving for s 2n and u in terms of z and using Λ(s) = λs −α we obtain
Observe that by construction Λ(s 2n ) Λ(s 2n ) + r = 4Λ(u) 2 (2Λ(u) + r) 2 , so that the Laplace transform at r of the duration to execute two trades by the ∆-investor is equal to the Laplace transform at r of the duration to execute one trade by the 2∆-investor. Using this fact, (3.11) is equivalent to
Since α > 1 and the terms on both sides of the above inequality are positive, we may raise both sides to the α-power and plug-in the expressions for s 2n and u to find
where the last inequality follows since z < 1 and α > 1. This shows that (3.11) holds and concludes the proof of the proposition.
Next, we show that the strategies also converge thanks to the concavity of all the functions involved.
Corollary 3.3. Let us denote by s (∆) the pointwise optimizer in (3.2). Then we have that
(Here, x is fixed and we take the limit over the grids that pass through x.)
Proof. On the one hand, as in Remark 2.1 we can think of s (∆) as something proportional to the left derivative of the linear interpolation of V ∆ , denoted byV ∆ , which is increasing and concave.
On the other hand, s (0) is proportional to the derivative of the concave differentiable function v.
By Theorem 24.5 on page 233 of [27] it however follows that for any x > 0,
for small enough ∆, where D − x denotes the left derivative operator with respect to x.
Remark 3.3. Theorem 3.1 tells us about the asymptotics of c n in (2.2):
Corollary 3.3 can be used to find out the marginal price asymptotics in Proposition 2.1:
Clearly, the spread will go to zero as n → ∞. But here we are able to obtain the rate of convergence to zero as a function of the remaining inventory.
For time to execution on infinite horizon we have for τ 1 = inf{t :
since intuitively when inventory is of size u, the expected time to liquidate an infinitesimal quantity du is inversely proportional to the current trading rate Λ(s (0) (u)). Plugging in s (0) (u) = ( λ αru ) 1/α we obtain Λ(s (0) (u)) = αru or S(x 1 , x 2 ) = 1 αr log(
) which shows that orders are filled in logarithmic time (as x 1 → 0 the remainder is executed arbitrarily slow).
Exponential-Decay Order Books
The power-law order book implies that trades can be made arbitrarily quickly as the spread goes to zero: lim s→0 Λ(s) = +∞. Also, it gives a relatively good chance of executing trades deep in the book, i.e. when s is large. For less liquid markets, both of these features might not be realistic. 
T ) uniformly on compacts, where v(x, T ) solves the nonlinear first
order PDE
with boundary conditions v(0, T ) = v(x, 0) = 0. The solution to this PDE satisfies
Remark 4.1. In the above notation x is the number of shares, which is fixed across the problems.
When we are taking the continuous liquidation limit, we let ∆ ↓ 0, the size of trading units, while taking the number of units n as n∆ = x, for x constant.
Proof. V ∆ (n∆, T ) satisfies the HJB equation
Letting B := λ κe , integrating and using V ∆ (·, 0) ≡ 0 we find for n = 1 that
Iterating over n the separable ODE for V ∆ (n, ·) in (4.5) we obtain (4.2). The expression for the optimal spread follows from s * (n∆, T ) =
The proof that as ∆ ↓ 0, V ∆ (n∆, T ) → v(x, T ) uniformly on compacts can be proven as in Theorem 3.1.
Observe that both bounds in (4.4) satisfy (4.3). To prove the lower bound, let us introduce the following function:Ṽ
Clearly,Ṽ ∆ ≤ V ∆ . From Stirling's formula we know that
where we use ∼ to indicate that the ratio of the left to the right-hand-side converges to 1 as n → ∞. As a result,Ṽ ∆ (x, T ) ∼ x/κ log(λT /x), recalling that x = n∆. Now the lower bound in (4.4) follows since v(x, T ) ≥ lim ∆↓0Ṽ ∆ . We could have provided an alternative proof using a comparison theorem for the first-order non-linear PDE (4.3) since in fact x/κ log(λT /x) also satisfies this PDE with a smaller boundary value at T = 0. We preferred to be more constructive in our proof.
The fact that λT /(κe) is an upper bound on v follows directly from the observation that v T ≤ λ/(κe) (recalling that v is increasing in x) and that v(x, 0) = 0. 
, T − t) is a constant function (let us
denote that value by s * ), it follows from (4.7) that
i.e., t → X 
where W is the Lambert-W function (or the double-log function defined as z = W(y) for ze z = y). 
Proof. The HJB equation for
Using the optimizer
we reduce to
which has closed-form solution given by (4.8) . Arguments similar to Theorem 3.1 imply that V ∆ → v uniformly on compacts and the continuous inventory limit satisfies
Solving for v ′ we obtain
The last nonlinear first-order ordinary differential equation has closed-form solution given in (4.9).
Asymptotically lim x→∞ v(x) = λ κre and the optimal spread is
We note that since v is increasing in x, x → s (0) (x) in (4.11) is decreasing and so v is concave.
As before, lim x→0 s (0) (x) = +∞ so the control space remains unbounded, however the pay-off rate ) ) is bounded. Moreover, a direct check verifies that V ∆ and v are inversely proportional to the exponential depth parameter κ, i.e. doubling κ (making the order book more shallow) halves V ∆ and v, and correspondingly halves the optimal spreads s (∆) and s (0) . Figure 1 graphically illustrates the difference between exponential-decay and power-law LOB's.
As observed, for an exponential LOB, s * is bounded away from zero, while lim x→∞ s * (x) = 0 in power LOB's. Moreover, while lim x↓0 s (0) (x) = +∞ in any LOB, the rate is much slower in an exponential LOB (due to thinner tail for large spreads) compared to power-LOB.
Discussion and Further Extensions
5.1. Numerical Example: Convergence to the Fluid Limit. To illustrate the convergence to the fluid limit consider the problem of selling up to x = 5 blocks of shares in a power-law LOB with Λ(s) = s −2 . We suppose that a block corresponds to 100 shares and that the minimal trading unit is either 5 or 1 shares, i.e. ∆ = 0.05 and ∆ = 0.01 respectively. For a fixed ∆, we can easily compute V ∆ (x = n∆) or v(x) using the results in Section 2. Figure 2 illustrates the percent difference between V ∆ and the fluid limit v. As shown in Proposition 3.2, V ∆ is decreasing in ∆ and lim ∆↓0 V ∆ = v. We observe that the convergence is quite rapid in x.
The right panel of Figure 2 shows that the controls themselves are also very close. We observe that s (∆) ց s (0) . Note that here we are essentially comparing s (0) with its right-sided Riemannsum approximation, since s (∆) (x) corresponds to the spread charged for all shares in [x, x − ∆) while s (0) (x) corresponds to the marginal spread at x. Accordingly, better approximations, such Given the simple expression for the fluid limit control s (0) (x), a useful approximation is to use a discretized version of s (0) as an approximately optimal control for V ∆ . Let
represent the expected gains from a discrete strategy which uses a spread of s (0) ((n − i)∆) for the i-th trade of size ∆. In the left panel of Figure 2 we see that this approximation is excellent for V ∆ even for moderate values of x (less than 1% difference for ∆ = 0.01 and x > 1).
Execution Curves.
A popular way of describing a trade execution algorithm is through the execution curve t → X t /X 0 , see e.g. [3, 4, 20] . In our model with execution risk, X t is a random variable, and we will therefore consider the natural analogue of average execution curve E(x, t) := E[X * ,x t ], where X * ,x is the remaining inventory at t ≤ T starting with initial condition X * ,x 0 = x . The baseline case whereĒ(x, t) = x(1 − t/T ) is linear, corresponds to "linear price impact" or zero-risk-aversion in [3] and implies that the average trading rate is constant.
For notational convenience we temporarily fix ∆ = 1. Recall that
where (M t ) is a martingale (the compensated order departure process), which implies by an application of Itô's formula that (E(x, t)) ∞ x=0 satisfies the system of inhomogenous linear ODEs
with E(0, t) ≡ 0. Any finite collection of these ODEs can be solved analytically using integrating factors, or numerically with any standard solver. Thus, whenever we have an explicit formula for the optimal spread s * (n, T ), E(x, t) is also available analytically (or more practically as a solution of an ODE). For the case of power-law order books, we obtain from Proposition 2.1 that
.
We observe that depending on the parameter values (in particular initial inventory k vis-a-vis order shape α), Λ(s * (k, T )) could be smaller or bigger than k/T , i.e. the ordering between the initial trading rate and constant trading is ambiguous. At the other end, as t → T , the spread s * (k, t)
goes to zero and consequently lim t→T dE(x, t)/dt = −∞. Figure 3 shows that as α increases, the shape of t → E(x, t) changes substantially. In particular for large α (corresponding to "thinner" power laws), the execution curve has an S-shape, with trading rate high in the beginning and end of the time interval. On the other hand, for α small, the execution curve lies entirely above the baseline, i.e. the limit order trader consistently executes slower. This occurs due to the two competing effects of trying to extract profit (which slows execution) and the time decay, i.e. the need to make the deadline which speeds up trading. We observe that when the limit order book is deep (small α), the profit effect dominates; this is a new phenomenon compared to most existing models, such as [20] .
Finally, as a comparison, Figure 3 also shows the deterministic case t → X (0),x t , see (3.6) . In the latter case, t → X (0),x t is strictly convex, which contrasts strongly with the pre-limit situation.
As ∆ → 0, execution risk vanishes and the discounting effect takes over, making the investor sell more in the beginning. Indeed, in the fluid limit the investor can smoothly drive X (0),x to zero, while for ∆ > 0, P(X * ,x t > 0) > 0 for any t < T , but X * ,x T = 0 since dE(x, t)/dt| t=T − = −∞. In the exponential order book case with no discounting, we observe that the trading rate Λ(s * (n, T − t)) is independent of the depth parameter κ. Moreover, numerical experiments suggest that E(x, t) is (slightly) convex in t, i.e. the trading rate is monotonically decreasing in time. This agrees with the classical results of [3] . Finally, we recall that Remark 4.3 shows that in the fluid limit, the execution rate is constant over time, and t → X (0),x is linear. This occurs because (X (0),x t , t) is the characteristic curve of the PDE given by (4.3) . This phenomenon resembles the constant trading rate in Alfonsi et al. [1] who studied (continuous) trading through market orders only, with the LOB depth function driving the price impact mechanism. Again, we find a sharp dichotomy between the deterministic limit where X (0),x T = 0 for x ≤ λe −1 T and the stochastic version where E(x, T ) > 0 strictly for all x > 0.
5.3.
General Order Book Depth Functions. Our basic setting can be readily extended to allow for more sophisticated or complex models. Below we review several such extensions; for ease of presentation we treat them in the stationary infinite-horizon setting.
Let us revisit the optimal execution problem for a generic order book depth function Λ(s). In general, there are no closed-form expressions for V (n) and the continuous fluid limit v(x) becomes a useful analytic tool to understand the solution structure. In that regard, both Theorem 3.1 and Proof. The proof of Theorem 3.1 can be done without much change since we did not make use of any special properties of Λ(s) there. We will prove the stated concavity and monotonicity
properties from which the statement of Corollary 3.3 follows immediately as before.
By time-stationarity between trading dates the controls are constant and the dynamic programming principle until the first jump time for V ∆ (x) gives
Differentiating the right-hand-side with respect to s, the first order condition for
V ∆ is non-decreasing; therefore, if the derivative of F is negative, then s (∆) (x) decreases in x.
Explicitly,
Thus, (5.2) is sufficient for x → s * (x) to be decreasing. Under this assumption and the assumption that Λ is decreasing we would have that x → Λ(s * (x)) Λ(s * (x))+r∆ is increasing, and as a result
Concavity of V ∆ on the other hand implies the concavity of v. This is thanks to the first assertion of the theorem from which we know that V ∆ converges to v uniformly on compacts. Next we will
show that s is a decreasing function. The value function v satisfies the first order PDE:
Optimizing over s yields
Hence v is concave if and only if the right-hand-side above is a decreasing function of x. However, it follows from (5.2) that the function
is increasing. As a result the concavity of v, which we have already shown, is equivalent to
5.4. Regime Switching Market Liquidity. Empirical evidence suggests that market liquidity is not constant, [14] . As a first step towards capturing more complex liquidity behavior, we consider a simple regime-switching model for market activity level in the power-law LOB's. More precisely, suppose that arrival rates are modulated by a two-state Markov chain M with states {0, 1}, 0
representing an active market and 1 representing a slow market. We will denote the transition rate from 0 to 1 by θ 0 , and the transition rate from 1 to 0 by θ 1 . Under regime 0, the arrival rates of the orders are Λ 0 (s) = λ 0 /s α , and under regime 1, the arrival rates of the orders are Λ 1 (s) = λ 1 /s α .
We will take λ 0 > λ 1 . We assume that M is observed and known by market participants.
Denote by U (n) (respectively W (n)) the infinite-horizon value function for an inventory of n shares under the active (resp. slow) market regime. The value functions satisfy the following system of equations:
with terminal condition U (0) = W (0) = 0. The continuous selling approximation of these functions, which we denote by u and w respectively satisfy the following system of ordinary differential equations:
with u(0) = w(0) = 0. Remark 5.2. Numerical computation of the solution of (5.9) should be handled with care since v ′ (0) (0) = ∞. We get around this singularity using the following observation: For x small enough, the benefit of large orders is negligible since the probability of getting a large order is very small. Therefore, close to zero, v(x) ≃ v 0 (x) = ( We also remark that the solution to (5.9) is in general no longer concave, with concavity likely to fail around the knots δ, 2δ, . . ., where the derivative v ′ does not exist.
Typically, trading intensity on the small-order exchange is several magnitudes larger than via the big trades (done through e.g. a proprietary dark pool, see e.g., [22] (α−1) α . The latter integral only involves powers of y and can be easily computed numerically. Similarly, the equations for higher-order terms are again first-order linear ODEs and so v 2 , etc., can be written iteratively in closed-form.
